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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge 
 This appeal involves an alleged conspiracy to fix prices 
in the titanium dioxide industry in violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. Appellant Valspar, a purchaser of titanium 
dioxide, claimed Appellee DuPont conspired with other 
titanium dioxide suppliers to fix prices. Valspar argued that the 
price-fixing agreement was made manifest primarily by thirty-
one parallel price increase announcements issued by the 
suppliers. DuPont countered that the parallel pricing was not 
the product of an agreement, but rather the natural consequence 
of the marketplace. Specifically, DuPont posited that because 
the market for titanium dioxide is an oligopoly, the price 
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movement was caused by “conscious parallelism”—an 
economic theory that explains oligopolists will naturally 
follow a competitor’s price increase in the hopes that each 
firm’s profits will increase. The District Court agreed with 
DuPont and granted its motion for summary judgment. We will 
affirm.  
I 
 The facts of this case were essentially undisputed in the 
District Court. The parties agree that the market for titanium 
dioxide is an oligopoly. Titanium dioxide is a commodity-like 
product with no substitutes, the market is dominated by a 
handful of firms, and there are substantial barriers to entry.  
 Valspar, a large-scale purchaser of titanium dioxide, 
alleges that a group of titanium dioxide suppliers conspired to 
increase prices. It claims that the conspiracy began when 
DuPont—the largest American supplier—joined the Titanium 
Dioxide Manufacturers Association (TDMA) in 2002, when 
the association opened participation to non-European 
companies. Shortly after joining the TDMA, DuPont 
announced a price increase. Within two weeks, DuPont’s price 
increase was matched by Millennium, Kronos, and Huntsman 
(other TDMA members and members of the alleged 
conspiracy). This began what Valspar alleged to be the 
“Conspiracy Period”— twelve years during which the alleged 
conspirators announced price increases 31 times.  
Valspar claims the conspiracy ended in late 2013 when 
DuPont exited the TDMA. According to Valspar’s 
calculations, the conspirators inflated the cost of titanium 
dioxide by an average of 16%. Because Valspar purchased 
$1.27 billion of titanium dioxide from DuPont during the 
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relevant period, it claims it was overcharged to the tune of $176 
million.  
II 
In 2010, a class of titanium dioxide purchasers filed a 
price-fixing action against the suppliers in the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland. Valspar opted out 
of that class and the remaining defendant suppliers settled the 
case after they were denied summary judgment. See In re 
Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 959 F. Supp. 2d 799, 832 (D. 
Md. 2013). Valspar then filed its own claim in the United 
States District Court for the District of Minnesota, which was 
subsequently severed. Valspar settled all claims except this one 
against DuPont, which was transferred to the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware, where DuPont 
moved for summary judgment. Although presented with 
“substantially the same record . . . as in the Maryland Class 
Action,” the District Court reached a “different conclusion.” 
Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours, 152 F. Supp. 3d 
234, 252 (D. Del. 2016). Reviewing the record and our Court’s 
precedents, the District Court found that “evidence of an actual 
agreement to fix prices” was “lacking.” Id. at 253. Reasoning 
that such evidence is necessary for a plaintiff to survive 
summary judgment, the District Court granted DuPont’s 
motion. Id.    
III 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Our standard of review is intertwined with substantive antitrust 
6 
 
law and the parties dispute its contours. We therefore begin by 
reviewing the applicable law. 
A 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. Unlike § 2 of 
the Sherman Act, which addresses monopolization and other 
illegal unilateral conduct, § 1 applies only when there is an 
agreement to restrain trade; so a single firm’s independent 
action, no matter how anticompetitive its aim, does not 
implicate § 1. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 
U.S. 752, 761 (1984). While some offenses under § 1 are 
reviewed for reasonableness, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885–86 (2007), others have 
no possible competitive virtue and are therefore per se illegal, 
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 
19–20 (1979). Horizontal price fixing (i.e., price fixing among 
competitors) is one such per se violation because it is a “threat 
to the central nervous system of the economy.” United States 
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).  
 Oligopolies pose a special problem under § 1 because 
rational, independent actions taken by oligopolists can be 
nearly indistinguishable from horizontal price fixing. This 
problem is the result of “interdependence,” which occurs 
because “any rational decision [in an oligopoly] must take into 
account the anticipated reaction of the other firms.” In re Flat 
Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 359 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(alteration omitted) (quoting Philip E. Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 207 (2d ed. 2000)). In a market 
with many firms, “the effects of any single firm’s price and 
output decisions ‘would be so diffused among its numerous 
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competitors that they would not be aware of any change.’” Id. 
(quoting Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, at 206). The opposite 
is true in an oligopoly, where any price movement “will have 
a noticeable impact on the market and on its rivals.” Id. 
(quoting Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, at 206); see also In re 
Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 875 (7th Cir. 
2015) (oligopolists “watch each other like hawks”). 
This “oligopolistic rationality” can cause 
supracompetitive prices because it discourages price 
reductions while encouraging price increases. A firm is 
unlikely to lower its price in an effort to win market share 
because its competitors will quickly learn of that reduction and 
match it, causing the first mover’s profits to decline and a 
subsequent decline in the overall profits of the industry. Flat 
Glass, 385 F.3d at 359. Similarly, if a firm announces a price 
increase, other market participants will know that “if they do 
not increase their prices to [the first-mover’s] level, [the first-
mover] may be forced to reduce its price to their level. Because 
each of the other firms know this, each will consider whether 
it is better off when all are charging the old price or [the new 
one]. They will obviously choose [the new price] when they 
believe that it will maximize industry profits.” Id. (quoting 
Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, at 207–08).  
The Supreme Court has explained that this behavior 
does not violate antitrust laws. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993). Even 
though such interdependence or “conscious parallelism” harms 
consumers just as a monopoly does, it is beyond the reach of 
antitrust laws for two reasons. First, some courts and scholars 
theorize “that interdependent behavior is not an ‘agreement’ 
within the term’s meaning under the Sherman Act.” Flat Glass, 
385 F.3d at 360 (citing Donald F. Turner, The Definition of 
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Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism 
and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 663–65 (1962)). 
And second, “it is close to impossible to devise a judicially 
enforceable remedy for ‘interdependent’ pricing.” Clamp-All 
Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 
1988) (Breyer, J.). The problem is this: “How does one order a 
firm to set its prices without regard to the likely reactions of its 
competitors?” Id. 
B 
 “When faced with whether a plaintiff has offered 
sufficient proof of an agreement to preclude summary 
judgment, a court must generally apply the same summary 
judgment standards that apply in other contexts.” Flat Glass, 
385 F.3d at 357. Accordingly, a court will enter summary 
judgment when the evidence shows “no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As in other summary 
judgment contexts, we “review the record as a whole and in the 
light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing reasonable 
inferences in its favor.” In re Chocolate Confectionary 
Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 396 (3d Cir. 2015).  
However, we have recognized there is “an important 
distinction” to this general standard in antitrust cases. Flat 
Glass, 385 F.3d at 357. “[A]ntitrust law limits the range of 
permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a § 1 
case.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 588 (1986). Specifically, “conduct as consistent with 
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, 
standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy.” 
9 
 
Id.1 The reason for this more rigorous standard is that mistaken 
inferences are especially costly in antitrust cases, since they 
                                              
1 As Valspar and our dissenting colleague point out, 
Matsushita involved an alleged conspiracy that did not make 
“economic sense,” 475 U.S. at 587, and the Court declined to 
draw liberal inferences because the defendants “had no rational 
economic motive to conspire,” id. at 596. While these unlikely-
to-succeed conspiracies provide one good reason to be 
circumspect in our inferences, we have explained that 
oligopolistic interdependence provides another good reason for 
inferential modesty. See Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 358 
(“[D]espite the absence of the Matsushita Court’s concerns, 
this Court and others have been cautious in accepting 
inferences from circumstantial evidence in cases involving 
allegations of horizontal price-fixing among oligopolists.” 
(emphasis added)); Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 397 (explaining that 
“despite the facial plausibility of the Plaintiff’s theory and the 
circumstantial evidence supporting it, we must be 
cautious. .  .  . [since] the U.S. chocolate market is a textbook 
example of an oligopoly and we cannot infer too much from 
mere evidence of parallel pricing among oligopolists” (citation 
omitted)). 
 
While the dissent’s interpretation of Matsushita is 
reasonable, it is contrary to Third Circuit jurisprudence. In 
Chocolate, we held that a plaintiff in an oligopoly case must 
provide inferences that show that the alleged conspiracy is 
“more likely than not.” 801 F.3d at 412. And in Flat Glass, we 
considered and rejected the dissent’s more limited reading of 
Matsushita by acknowledging that some scholars think our 
extension of Matsushita is “an unfortunate misinterpretation” 
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could penalize desirable competitive behavior and “chill the 
very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.” Id. at 
594.2  
With those principles informing our analysis, this Court 
has developed specialized evidentiary standards at summary 
judgment in antitrust cases in general and in oligopoly cases in 
particular. Our analysis often begins with evidence of parallel 
price movements. See Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 397. In non-
oligopolistic markets, “[p]arallel behavior among competitors 
is especially probative of price fixing because it is the sine qua 
non of a price fixing conspiracy.” Southway Theatres, Inc. v. 
Ga. Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 501 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). But 
in an oligopolistic market, parallel behavior “can be a 
necessary fact of life,” In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 
F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1999), and “[a]ccordingly, evidence of 
conscious parallelism cannot alone create a reasonable 
                                              
of that case while nonetheless continuing our “circumspect 
approach.” 385 F.3d at 359 & n.9 (citation omitted). 
 
2 If a plaintiff provides direct evidence, then the 
“strictures of Matsushita [do] not apply.” Petruzzi’s IGA 
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 
1233 (3d Cir. 1993). That is because “no inferences are 
required from direct evidence to establish a fact and thus a 
court need not be concerned about the reasonableness of the 
inferences to be drawn from such evidence.” Id. Valspar’s 
appeal does not involve direct evidence of conspiracy, and 
such evidence is rare in price-fixing cases. See In re Plywood 
Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 633 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(“[S]olemnized covenants to conspire are difficult to come by 
in any price fixing case.”).  
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inference of a conspiracy,” Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 398. 
Therefore, to prove an oligopolistic conspiracy with proof of 
parallel behavior, that evidence “must go beyond mere 
interdependence” and “be so unusual that in the absence of an 
advance agreement, no reasonable firm would have engaged in 
it.” Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 135.  
Because proof of parallel behavior will rarely itself 
create an inference of conspiracy, a plaintiff will often need to 
“show that certain plus factors are present” in order “[t]o move 
the ball across the goal line.” Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 398–99. 
“Plus factors are proxies for direct evidence because they tend 
to ensure that courts punish concerted action—an actual 
agreement.” Id. (internal formatting and citations omitted). 
“Although we have not identified an exhaustive list of plus 
factors, they may include (1) evidence that the defendant had a 
motive to enter into a price fixing conspiracy; (2) evidence that 
the defendant acted contrary to its interests; and (3) evidence 
implying a traditional conspiracy.” Id. at 398.  
While normally all three plus factors are weighed 
together, in the case of oligopolies the first two factors are 
deemphasized because they “largely restate the phenomenon 
of interdependence.” Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360. Put another 
way, “[e]vidence of a motive to conspire means the market is 
conducive to price fixing, and evidence of actions against self-
interest means there is evidence of behavior inconsistent with 
a competitive market.” Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 398. Since those 
qualities are intrinsic to oligopolies, we instead focus on the 
third plus factor: “evidence implying a traditional conspiracy.” 
Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360 (citation omitted). To meet this 
factor, we require “proof that the defendants got together and 
exchanged assurances of common action or otherwise adopted 
a common plan even though no meetings, conversations, or 
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exchanged documents are shown.” Id. at 361 (citations 
omitted).3 
                                              
3 Valspar seems to argue that proof of a tacit agreement 
among the suppliers—that is, an awareness that they were 
engaging in conscious parallelism—should suffice to meet this 
factor. We disagree. While tacit agreements remain illegal 
under § 1, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 
(2007), the third plus factor requires evidence implying 
traditional (i.e., explicit) conspiracy. See Flat Glass, 385 F.3d 
at 361 (requiring proof of an “actual, manifest agreement not 
to compete” (citation omitted)). As a practical matter, tacit 
conspiracy and conscious parallelism are difficult to 
differentiate, if such differentiation is possible at all. See 
Andrew Gavil, Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts, 
and Problems in Competition Policy 311 (2d ed. 2008) (“[The] 
boundary between tacit agreements—to which Section 1 
applies—and parallel pricing stemming from oligopolistic 
interdependence” is not clear.); George A. Hay, Horizontal 
Agreements: Concept and Proof, 51 Antitrust Bull. 877, 894–
95 & n.46 (2006) (theorizing how to distinguish between a tacit 
agreement and oligopolistic interdependence—“[i]f that can be 
done”—while noting that the distinctions might totally be lost 
on a jury). We have tried to eradicate this confusion by placing 
emphasis on the third plus factor and requiring “traditional 
conspiracy” evidence. See Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360–61. In 
other words, we realized that the type of evidence that might 
prove a “tacit” conspiracy (e.g., motive, actions against self-
interest, parallel behavior, etc., Interstate Circuit v. United 
States, 306 U.S. 208, 225–28 (1939)) in the context of 
oligopolies can be unhelpfully equivocal, and thus decided to 
focus on evidence generally required to show an explicit, 
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After evaluating the evidence through our plus factor 
analysis, we then assess whether, “[c]onsidering the evidence 
as a whole,” it is “more likely than not [that the defendants] 
conspired to fix prices.” Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 412.4 This 
Court has at times employed different approaches for sifting 
through the proffered evidence. Compare Flat Glass, 385 F.3d 
363–69 (summarizing all of plaintiff’s evidence without 
editorializing, and then performing an “Analytical Summary” 
                                              
manifest agreement. Moreover, the sort of proof that would 
generally count towards proving a tacit conspiracy is largely 
accounted for in different parts of our oligopoly summary 
judgment framework. See Baby Food¸166 F.3d at 121–23, 130 
(considering parallel pricing before the plus factors); Flat 
Glass, 385 F.3d at 360 (considering actions against self-
interest and motive as part of first two plus factors). Although 
we do not rule out the possibility that evidence of a tacit 
agreement could suffice to meet this factor when a plaintiff also 
offers non-economic evidence of a traditional conspiracy—for 
example, when Company A proposes a parallel price increase 
to Company B, and Company B does not explicitly agree but 
then follows suit when Company A raises its prices, see 
Interstate, 306 U.S. at 222—economic evidence alone cannot 
demonstrate a tacit agreement under our oligopoly cases. 
 
4 While the dissent wonders what it will “now take for 
a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence to move the ball 
across the goal line,” Dissent at 6, the above precedents already 
resolve that question. Namely, the plaintiff’s inferences must 
show that conspiracy is “more likely than not.” Chocolate, 801 
F.3d at 412. That may be a high bar—but it is the bar 
established by this Court and binding on this panel.  
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to decide whether the body of evidence made conspiracy more 
likely than not), with Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 403–12 (looking 
at individual groupings of evidence to see whether any 
“supported an inference of conspiracy,” id. at 408, and then 
taking a holistic view of the evidence in context and 
determining that “it does not tend to exclude the possibility that 
[defendants] acted lawfully,” id. at 412). Whatever method is 
used, the bottom line is that “a plaintiff relying on ambiguous 
evidence alone cannot raise a reasonable inference of a 
conspiracy sufficient to survive summary judgment,” 
Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 396, but—like in all other summary 
judgment cases—that evidence must be viewed in the context 
of all other evidence, Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., 
Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1364–65 (3d Cir. 1992). 
IV 
 We now turn to the evidence of record, which we will 
evaluate in light of the principles just outlined. We first 
consider the parallel pricing evidence, then move to evidence 
under the plus factors, and finally consider the record in toto. 
A 
1 
 Valspar bases its case primarily on the 31 parallel price 
increase announcements issued by the competitors during the 
alleged conspiracy, arguing that it is “inconceivable” that, on 
31 occasions, the competitors “conduct[ed] independent 
analyses . . . [and] nearly simultaneously arrived at identical 
price increase amounts to be implemented on exactly the same 
day.” Valspar Br. 37. 
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Valspar’s argument fails for two reasons. First, its 
characterization of the suppliers’ price announcements 
neglects the theory of conscious parallelism and flies in the 
face of our doctrine that in an oligopoly “any rational decision 
must take into account the anticipated reaction of the other . . . 
firms.” Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 122 (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted).5 Thus, DuPont does not claim that the 
competitors’ numerous parallel price increases were discrete 
events—nor could it do so with a straight face. But it doesn’t 
need to. The theory of interdependence recognizes that price 
movement in an oligopoly will be just that: interdependent. 
And that phenomenon frequently will lead to successive price 
increases, because oligopolists may “conclude that the industry 
as a whole would be better off by raising prices.” Chocolate, 
801 F.3d at 397.6 
                                              
5 Indeed, this same mistake pervades Valspar’s 
argument. As the District Court aptly explained, Valspar 
generally “neglects the theory of interdependence.” Valspar, 
152 F. Supp. 3d at 248. For example, despite the central role 
“conscious parallelism” and “interdependence” play in our 
oligopoly caselaw, each of those phrases appear only once in 
Valspar’s opening brief.  
 
6 Valspar also notes that the suppliers’ executives 
denied engaging in “follow the leader pricing.” Valspar Br. 15. 
Essentially, Valspar is arguing that we should infer a 
conspiracy from this potential pretext. That argument fails 
under our caselaw because “pretextual reasons are insufficient 
to create a genuine issue of fact without other evidence 
pointing to a price-fixing agreement.” Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 
16 
 
 Second, Valspar does not engage this Court’s 
demanding rule that in order to raise an inference of conspiracy 
on this point, it was required to show that the suppliers’ parallel 
pricing went “beyond mere interdependence [and was] so 
unusual that in the absence of advance agreement, no 
reasonable firm would have engaged in it.” Baby Food, 166 
F.3d at 135. Valspar never cites this important controlling 
precedent, nor does it attempt to show how it might be met.  
Apart from Valspar’s failure to carry its burden, DuPont 
demonstrates that “market realities . . . clearly controvert 
[Valspar’s] contention” that these announcements are evidence 
of a conspiracy. Id. at 131. First, supply contracts in the 
titanium dioxide industry contained price-protection clauses 
requiring a notice period to customers before a price increase, 
meaning that if a supplier failed to match a competitor’s 
announcement, it was foregoing the possibility of negotiating 
a price increase during that period. These industry-wide 
contractual provisions made the benefit of matching a price 
increase announcement high and the risk minimal: if a 
competitor later undercut that price in an effort to take market 
share, the supplier could refrain from implementing the price 
increase or even respond by lowering its price. Second, DuPont 
demonstrated that the market for titanium dioxide remained 
competitive despite the frequent price increase 
announcements. Indeed, Valspar employees testified that it 
was “very common” to negotiate away a supplier’s attempt to 
increase price, DuPont Br. 6, and said that “[o]ften . . . an 
aggressive supplier would be interested in achieving more 
volume and would come in and offer a [lower] price,” id. at 9. 
                                              
411 (alterations omitted) (quoting Miles Distribs. v. Specialty 
Constr. Brands, Inc., 476 F.3d 442, 452 (7th Cir. 2007)).  
17 
 
Across all suppliers’ attempted price increases, Valspar was 
able to avoid that increase (or even negotiate a decrease) one-
third of the time. Thus, Valspar’s characterization of this 
evidence is controverted by market realities; “aggressive” and 
“common” price competition between firms is inconsistent 
with the idea that those same firms have conspired not to 
compete on price.7 
2 
 Valspar also advances the related argument that the 
flurry of price announcements reflects a drastic change from 
pre-conspiracy behavior in the titanium dioxide market. A 
change in industry practices must be “radical” or “abrupt” to 
“create an inference of a conspiracy.” Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 
410 (citation omitted). Valspar claims to have met this standard 
because there were only three parallel price increase 
announcements before the alleged conspiracy period (as 
compared to the thirty-one during the conspiracy period).  
                                              
7 Thus, the circumstances here are different than those 
in Flat Glass, where we stated that “[a]n agreement to fix 
prices is a per se violation of the Sherman Act even if most or 
for that matter all transactions occurred at lower [than list] 
prices.” 385 F.3d at 362 (citation and alteration omitted). Here, 
we find significant not just that actual prices occurred below 
announced prices, but that actual prices occurred below 
announced prices because alleged conspirators frequently 
undercut other members of the alleged conspiracy. We are 
mindful that a “failed attempt to fix prices” is illegal, id. at 363, 
but it is likewise significant that the alleged conspirators 
behaved contrary to the existence of a conspiracy.  
 
18 
 
 We disagree. In Chocolate, the plaintiffs advanced a 
similar argument, relying on an increased frequency in parallel 
pricing activity from pre-conspiracy behavior. There, we 
explained that “the focus of the Plaintiffs’ argument is unduly 
narrow” because “[h]istorically, parallel pricing in the U.S. 
chocolate market has not been at all uncommon.” Chocolate, 
801 F.3d at 410. Here too, public parallel price increase 
announcements are “consistent with how this industry has 
historically operated.” Valspar, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 252 
(quoting Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 410). Similarly, when other 
courts have found a radical or abrupt change to indicate 
conspiracy, that change has generally been more than just an 
uptick in frequency of a pre-established industry practice. See 
Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(group of toy distributors unanimously stopped dealing with 
warehouse clubs after years of that being an industry norm). 
That logic rings particularly true in this context because “it is 
generally unremarkable for the pendulum in oligopolistic 
markets to swing from less to more interdependent and 
cooperative.” Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 410 (citing Areeda & 
Hovenkamp, supra, at 229).  
B 
 Having found that the pattern of parallel price increases 
does not raise an inference of conspiracy, we next turn to 
Valspar’s argument that the plus factors evidence a conspiracy. 
As explained above, this Court has developed a specialized 
rule that in oligopolistic markets, “‘the first two factors largely 
restate the phenomenon of interdependence,’ . . . [which] 
leaves traditional non-economic evidence of a conspiracy as 
the most important plus factor.” Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 398 
(citation omitted). Tellingly, Valspar ignores this important 
point and instead emphasizes why the first two plus factors are 
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met. Valspar’s “victory . . . is a hollow one,” however, having 
succeeded in showing interdependence but not conspiracy. Id. 
at 400. 
1 
The first factor relates to motive to enter a conspiracy, 
i.e., that “the market is conducive to price fixing.” Id. at 398. 
There is little doubt that this highly concentrated market for a 
commodity-like product with no viable substitutes and 
substantial barriers to entry was conducive to price fixing.  
The second plus factor looks for evidence of action 
against self-interest, i.e., “evidence that the market behaved in 
a noncompetitive manner.” Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 361 
(citation omitted). Valspar presents evidence that there was “a 
16% overcharge” and that “price increases were not correlated 
to supply-and-demand principles.” Valspar Br. 57. While true, 
this is largely irrelevant because it ignores the fact that “firms 
in a concentrated market may maintain their prices at 
supracompetitive levels, or even raise them to those levels, 
without engaging in any overt concerted action.” Flat Glass, 
385 F.3d at 359.8 
                                              
8 Although the first two plus factors may, at times, “do 
more than restate economic interdependence,” Flat Glass, 385 
F.3d at 361 n.12, Valspar has not shown that they do so here. 
For example, despite the dissent’s insistence to the contrary, 
there is no evidence of record showing “unilateral exchanges 
of confidential price information,” which is one example of an 
action against self-interest that may not simply be a result of 
interdependence. See Dissent at 10 (quoting Flat Glass, 385 
F.3d at 361 n.12); see also infra Part IV-B-2 (discussing the 
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Most of Valspar’s other economic expert evidence 
addresses the first two plus factors as well. See Flat Glass, 385 
F.3d at 361 (explaining that the third plus factor is where “non-
economic evidence” should be considered (emphasis added)). 
For example, Valspar notes that its expert “concluded there 
was economic evidence of ability to enforce their price-fixing 
agreement,” and “found from an economic point of view the 
markets were relatively stable.” Valspar Br. 41, 43. From 
findings like these, Valspar argues that “the district court 
should have accepted [the expert’s] economic conclusions” 
that the competitors could not have acted independently. 
Valspar Br. 42. This gets things backwards. There is no dispute 
that the market was primed for anticompetitive 
interdependence and that it operated in that manner. Valspar’s 
expert evidence confirming these facts mastered the obvious.9 
                                              
information exchanges shown to have occurred between the 
suppliers).  
 
9 In addition, Valspar would have us give the expert’s 
conclusion an outsized role in the summary judgment analysis. 
While we have explained that a district court should not 
“impermissibly weigh[]” expert evidence by picking out 
“potential flaws,” Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1241, that does not 
mean that a district court is obligated to accept an expert’s legal 
conclusions, Dalberth v. Xerox Corp., 766 F.3d 172, 189 (2d 
Cir. 2014). Although Valspar’s expert, Dr. Williams, 
concluded that its evidence excludes the inference that the 
competitors acted independently, that conclusion was based on 
predicates that are insufficient under our caselaw. For example, 
Dr. Williams took the type of evidence that we have said is of 
diminished value in the oligopoly context (i.e., parallel price 
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2 
We finally reach Valspar’s evidence under our third 
plus factor: traditional conspiracy evidence, where we look for 
“proof that the defendants got together and exchanged 
assurances of common action or otherwise adopted a common 
plan even though no meetings, conversations, or exchanged 
documents are shown.”10 Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 361 (citation 
omitted). We approach the third plus factor as this Court did in 
Chocolate, first considering individual groups of evidence to 
see whether any raise an inference of conspiracy, before 
evaluating all of the proof in context. See 801 F.3d at 403–12. 
Here, we agree with the District Court that Valspar failed to 
raise an inference of conspiracy. Each strand of evidence is 
weaker than similar evidence in cases where this Court has 
                                              
movement and evidence best considered under the first two 
plus factors) and from there concluded that the suppliers had 
illegally conspired. The District Court was correct to reject this 
line of argument and note that the evidence from which the 
expert based his conclusions is “not necessarily . . . evidence 
of an agreement” under our oligopoly caselaw. Valspar, 152 F. 
Supp. 3d at 243.  
 
10 The dissent claims that we ignore this precedent and 
“required[] Valspar to present evidence of direct meetings and 
conversations.” Dissent at 20. Not so. There is no doubt that a 
plaintiff can satisfy this plus factor with circumstantial 
evidence, but that circumstantial evidence must indicate the 
existence of an “actual, manifest agreement not to compete.” 
Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 361 (citation omitted). While Valspar 
marshals circumstantial evidence of anticompetitive behavior, 
the record does not show the existence of an actual agreement.   
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affirmed summary judgment in favor of companies that operate 
in an oligopolistic market.  
First, Valspar shows that DuPont and the other 
competitors took part in a data sharing program offered by the 
Titanium Dioxide Manufacturers Association. As part of this 
program (the Global Statistics Program, or GSP) the 
competitors provided production, inventory, and sales-volume 
data (but never price data) to the TDMA, which then 
aggregated, anonymized, and redistributed the data.  
Without citing any precedent to show why this type of 
information sharing was illegal, Valspar argues that the GSP 
allowed each conspirator to calculate its own market share and 
thus deduce whether it was getting its fair share of the 
conspiracy’s profits. This argument suffers from the loaded 
question fallacy. Instead of setting out to prove: “Does the GSP 
show that a conspiracy existed?,” Valspar attempts to answer: 
“How did the GSP further the conspiracy?” This approach 
cannot satisfy Valspar’s burden. “[A] litigant may not proceed 
by first assuming a conspiracy and then explaining the 
evidence accordingly.” Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash 
Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2000).  
Moreover, our prior decisions undermine Valspar’s 
argument that the GSP supports an inference of conspiracy For 
example, in Baby Food, we affirmed summary judgment 
despite the fact that the alleged conspirators’ sales 
representatives had “exchang[ed] pricing information,” 
explaining that there was no evidence these exchanges had any 
effect over the companies’ final pricing decisions, 166 F.3d 
117, and observing, in any event, that “[t]he exchange of price 
data . . . can in certain circumstances increase economic 
efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, 
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competitive.” Id. at 125 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum 
Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443 n.16 (1978)). And in Flat Glass, the 
alleged conspirators each provided price data to a business that 
would use those inputs to set recommended prices for the 
industry. 385 F.3d at 355. The alleged conspirators knew how 
the recommended prices were calculated, so “were able to 
calculate backwards” and determine the price inputs used. Id. 
at 370. We explained that although this would rightfully “raise 
suspicion,” the “publication of pricing information can have a 
pro-competitive effect” and, with little other evidence 
supporting the inference of a conspiracy, affirmed summary 
judgment on that claim. Id. 
The data exchanged as part of the GSP looks innocuous 
when compared to the information in Baby Food and Flat 
Glass. The GSP aggregated and blinded “members’ monthly 
sales, production, and inventory data worldwide,” but never 
collected price information. Valspar Br. 47. Valspar argues that 
“the co-conspirators partially disaggregated the data to track 
individual firms.” Valspar Br. 48. But as the District Court 
noted, “the evidence provided by Valspar does not support this 
conclusion” and Valspar’s own expert conceded that the GSP 
merely allowed each firm to calculate its own market share. 
Valspar, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 245–46.11 
                                              
11 Additionally, the GSP most resembled a data 
collection program blessed by the Ninth Circuit in In re Citric 
Acid Litigation, where a centralized trade association 
“collected figures on production and sales from each of its 
members, audited this information on an annual basis, and 
produced statistics aggregated by country on citric acid 
production and sales.” 191 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 
That court called the program “wholly legal” and explained 
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Relatedly, Valspar claims that the alleged conspirators 
“used the TDMA meetings to communicate their pricing plans, 
coordinate price increases, and confirm that each competitor 
would follow the leader on price increases.” Valspar Br. 50. 
Valspar’s argument essentially begins and ends with 
opportunity: the TDMA meetings brought the competitors 
together, so one should assume that they used the meetings to 
conspire. But as the District Court noted, “[t]here is no 
evidence that there was any discussion of prices during these 
meetings and certainly no evidence of an agreement.” Valspar, 
152 F. Supp. 3d at 246. Consequently, Valspar’s argument falls 
short under our precedents. Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 409 
(“[E]vidence . . . that the executives from the [alleged 
conspirators] were in the same place at the same time . . . is 
insufficient to support a reasonable inference of concerted 
activity.”); Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Del. 
Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Proof of opportunity 
to conspire, without more, will not sustain an inference that a 
conspiracy has taken place.” (citation omitted)).  
Next, Valspar suggests that the competitors used 
industry consultants as conduits to funnel information. For 
example, Valspar points to an e-mail from a Kronos employee 
to a consultant noting that the employee had heard rumors of 
an impending Huntsman price increase, but thought it 
“sound[ed] weird” and wanted to know if the consultant could 
“confirm anything from [his] lofty position.” Valspar Br. 20.  
                                              
that it was “uncontested that these activities served the 
legitimate purpose of informing members of [market] 
conditions.” Id.  
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This sort of inquiry to a consultant is not probative of 
conspiracy. We have explained that “it makes common sense 
to obtain as much information as possible of the pricing 
policies and marketing strategies of one’s competitors.” Baby 
Food, 166 F.3d at 126. In fact, this type of inquiry undermines 
the existence of a conspiracy because conspirators would have 
no need to ask consultants about the specifics of their own 
conspiracy. See Mayor & City Council of Balt., Md. v. 
Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d 129, 139 (2d Cir. 2013) (attempts to 
confirm future pricing plans of competitors “tend to suggest 
the absence of [competitor] communications” because if 
competitors were communicating directly they “would not 
have had to rely on third parties to confirm [each other’s] 
strateg[ies]”).  
Valspar also emphasizes a selection of internal e-mails 
sent by the various competitors. For example, a DuPont e-mail 
advocated for a price modification “[o]nly if you are not 
undercutting a Kronos price increase!” Valspar Br. 9. A 
Millennium e-mail said: “We should have this extra [market] 
share—customers have been and want to buy this from us. 
Competitors will let us have this.” Id. at 8. And a Cristal e-mail 
stated that “all major global players have been very disciplined 
with pricing implementation up to this point.” Id. at 10.  
These e-mails are helpful to Valspar, but only 
superficially. They may raise some suspicion insofar as they 
indicate that something anticompetitive is afoot. But as we 
have explained, oligopolistic conscious parallelism is by 
nature anticompetitive and also legal. See Chocolate, 801 F.3d 
at 397. Essentially, these e-mails show that the competitors 
were aware of the phenomenon of conscious parallelism and 
implemented pricing strategies in response to it. It makes sense 
that each firm would implement such strategies, since 
26 
 
conscious parallelism allows firms in an oligopoly to “in effect 
share monopoly power” and maintain “prices at a profit-
maximizing, supracompetitive level.” Brooke Group, 509 U.S. 
at 227. To forbid firms in an oligopoly from considering 
conscious parallelism in its internal pricing decisions would be 
to require a firm to do the impossible: “set its prices without 
regard to the likely reactions of its competitors.” Clamp-All 
Corp., 851 F.2d at 484 (Breyer, J.). 
This logic explains away most of Valspar’s concerns. 
For example, DuPont would not want to undercut a Kronos 
price increase, because doing so would result in Kronos 
lowering its price and a concomitant decrease in profits for 
everyone. See Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 359. Moreover, these 
same e-mails show that the competitors engaged in 
independent and contemporaneous internal deliberations. For 
example, a DuPont employee wrote: “From a testing 
perspective, it may be valuable to make the October 
announcement. If our competitors do follow, it sends a clear 
message to us that they are receiving/understanding our price 
increase messages . . . If they don’t, we would also learn how 
well we’ve trained them.” Valspar Br. 17 (emphases added).12 
                                              
12 Although Valspar and the dissent contend that the 
competitors implemented their conspiracy through public 
announcements of their price increases, these e-mails reflect 
that, even if such “signalling” occurred, it was not in 
furtherance of any prior agreement. Had the competitors 
“got[ten] together and exchanged assurances of common 
action or otherwise adopted a common plan,” Flat Glass, 385 
F.3d at 361, there would have been no need for DuPont to 
resort to public announcements to “test” whether its 
competitors were “receiving/understanding [its] price increase 
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And a Kronos employee wrote that it “hope[d] that Du[P]ont 
is smart enough not to undo what we have all done in the TiO2 
market by keeping some sort of discipline.” Id. at 10 (first 
alteration in original) (emphasis added). We have explained 
that documents showing this type of internal deliberation may 
negate an inference of conspiracy. Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 131 
(rejecting plaintiff’s interpretation of a set of documents 
because “[c]ontemporaneous documents also show that [an 
alleged conspirator] made independent pricing decisions.”); 
Text Messaging, 782 F.3d at 873 (noting that nothing in the 
allegedly collusive e-mails “suggests that [the defendants] 
believed there was a conspiracy among the carriers”). 13 
                                              
messages.” See Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 
F.3d 1287, 1310 (11th Cir. 2003) (refusing to infer a 
conspiracy from signalling among oligopolists absent evidence 
that it was in furtherance of an agreement); Blomkest Fertilizer, 
Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1037 
(8th Cir. 2000) (same). 
 
13 The dissent reads these e-mails differently, arguing 
that they show the competitors (1) often “would not undercut 
one another’s prices [(2)] and that they were involved in an 
organization (i.e., cartel) controlling prices.” Dissent at 11 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). We agree with the first 
proposition, but that is a natural consequence of oligopolistic 
interdependence. See Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 359. As for the 
second proposition, we do not see enough evidence in the 
record to support it. While the internal e-mails indicate that the 
suppliers knew their pricing decisions may be consciously 
parallel and that their collective interests would at times be 
aligned, the e-mails do not evidence an explicit agreement to 
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Finally, Valspar highlights a handful of inter-competitor 
sales at below market prices, arguing that those sales were used 
to redistribute gains and losses to maintain the alleged 
conspiracy. But looking to the specific facts present here, the 
District Court found that the sales were “just as consistent with 
non-collusive activity as with conspiracy.” Valspar, 152 F. 
Supp. 3d at 244. First, Valspar’s expert conceded that the sales 
were at such low volumes that they would not have resulted in 
large shifts of market share, thus largely defeating Valspar’s 
theory of profit redistribution. Second, Hurricane Katrina 
knocked out one of DuPont’s titanium dioxide plants so it was 
unable to meet all its internal demand for the product, requiring 
DuPont to purchase it from other firms. Importantly, these 
sales occurred at prices sometimes higher and sometimes lower 
than the average prices for non-defendants. And third, a 
number of these sales were made by DuPont to Kronos 
pursuant to a cross-licensing agreement in order to avoid patent 
litigation. After this licensing agreement ended, DuPont 
successfully negotiated a price increase.  
Valspar does not seriously dispute these explanations, 
but instead argues “[i]f one seller buys anything from another 
at nonmarket prices, then a resource transfer is made for which 
there is no reasonable, noncollusive explanation.” Reply Br. 21 
(quoting Willam E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and 
Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 393, 423 
(2011)). Valspar offers no case support for this proposition, but 
instead puts all its eggs in the basket of a single law review 
article. See id. But that law review article: (a) spends only one 
                                              
fix prices—and often show that such an agreement was 
lacking.  
 
29 
 
paragraph on this theory; (b) cites no precedent or economic 
studies to support it; (c) recognizes that patent licensing and 
cross licensing can be legitimate; and (d) seems to limit its 
analysis to “interfirm transfers of resources that are largely 
void of productive unilateral motivations.” Kovacic, supra, at 
423. In the face of DuPont’s reasonable explanations to the 
contrary, we decline to give this isolated quotation the force of 
law.  
3 
 Having considered each piece of evidence individually 
and decided that none raises an inference of conspiracy, we 
must now consider the evidence as a whole.14 See Chocolate, 
801 F.3d at 412. To summarize, granting all legitimate 
inferences to Valspar, it presented evidence of: parallel price 
movement, internal e-mails showing an awareness of this 
parallel price movement, competitor participation in a trade 
association and statistics sharing program, inter-firm sales at 
                                              
14 Our dissenting colleague claims that, in the foregoing 
section, we went through “each individual piece of evidence 
and disregard[ed] it if we could feasibly interpret it as 
consistent with the absence of an agreement to raise prices.” 
Dissent at 19 (citation omitted). That misunderstands our mode 
of analysis. For the sake of coherence, we presented and 
discussed each piece of evidence separately, and found that no 
single piece on its own, made a conspiracy more likely than 
not. (After all, if a single piece of evidence made conspiracy 
more likely than not, Valspar would survive summary 
judgment and our task would end.) We now consider the 
evidence together to determine whether the entire body of 
evidence—viewed in context—tips the scale in Valspar’s 
favor.  
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below market prices, and use of industry consultants. In 
assessing this evidence, we look to this Court’s three cases 
examining alleged oligopolistic conspiracies at summary 
judgment: Chocolate and Baby Food, where summary 
judgment was granted, and Flat Glass, where summary 
judgment was partially denied.  
First, Valspar did not offer any single form of evidence 
that would have gotten it close to showing that a conspiracy is 
more likely than not. Valspar emphasizes the pattern of parallel 
price announcements, but for the reasons explained, we don’t 
find them particularly persuasive. See supra Section IV-A-1, 
2. By comparison, in Chocolate and Baby Food, where 
summary judgment was granted in favor of the alleged 
conspirators, the plaintiffs’ cases were supported with far 
stronger lead evidence than present here. For example, the 
Chocolate plaintiffs established that the very same defendants 
had been part of a contemporaneous price-fixing conspiracy in 
Canada—to which one of the defendants had already pleaded 
guilty to the Canadian authorities. 801 F.3d at 393, 402. In 
Baby Food, the defendants had advance knowledge of each 
other’s planned price increases (or decisions not to raise prices) 
on several occasions. 166 F.3d at 119–20. And this pales in 
comparison to Flat Glass—our one case in which defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment was denied—where one of the 
defendant’s alleged co-conspirators confessed to “an agreed 
upon, across the board price increase for the entire United 
States” to the Department of Justice in an attempt to gain 
leniency. 385 F.3d at 363 (citation omitted).  
Just as Valspar’s lead evidence is weaker than that in 
our relevant cases, so too is its supporting evidence. For 
example, although Valspar alleges that the competitors may 
have swapped certain price information through the TDMA or 
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consultants, there is no evidence that price information was 
ever voluntarily exchanged, and the information that allegedly 
was exchanged through these sources pales in comparison to 
what was shared in cases where we affirmed summary 
judgment to defendants. See supra Section IV-B-2. Likewise, 
the internal e-mails uncovered by Valspar look harmless next 
to those in our caselaw. First, all of the e-mails uncovered by 
Valspar were internal to each competitor, whereas in Baby 
Food there was regular communication between competitors. 
166 F.3d at 119–20. Moreover, there is nothing in the 
competitors’ e-mails to indicate that their pricing behavior was 
the result of an actual agreement (as opposed to conscious 
parallelism), unlike in Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 120 (referring 
to the competitors’ “truce”). And again, these e-mails do not 
approach those from Flat Glass, where one conspirator wrote 
that it was “monitoring the market to make sure that all stick to 
the rules” and admitted that one of the conspirators “assured 
me that they were fully supportive of the price increase 
proposition.” 385 F.3d at 366–67 (citations omitted).  
In sum, after reviewing the record as a whole, we 
conclude that the District Court did not err when it held that 
Valspar’s evidence did not meet our standard to survive 
summary judgment.  
C 
 One final point deserves mention. Valspar makes much 
of the District of Maryland litigation where summary judgment 
was denied on a materially similar record. It argues that 
“principles of comity and the doctrine of stare decisis should 
have given the Delaware court greater pause before reaching a 
decision in conflict with the Maryland Action.” Valspar Br. 61.  
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 Valspar’s argument has an obvious flaw: the District of 
Maryland sits within the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 41. Thus, the Maryland District 
Court had no obligation to consider Third Circuit precedent, 
but the District Court in this case was bound by it. This resulted 
in the Maryland court applying a standard quite different from 
the one we have developed and that the District Court applied. 
Compare Valspar, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 240 (“A plaintiff relying 
on ambiguous evidence alone cannot raise a reasonable 
inference of conspiracy sufficient to survive summary 
judgment.” (quoting Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 396–97)), with 
Titanium Dioxide, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 824 (“[W]here ‘a plaintiff 
relies on ambiguous evidence to prove its claim, the existence 
of a conspiracy must be a reasonable inference that the jury 
could draw from that evidence.’” (citing In re Publ’n Paper 
Antitrust Litig., 690 F.3d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 2012)). In light of 
Third Circuit precedent applying § 1 of the Sherman Act to 
oligopolies, the District Court did not err.15 
                                              
15 Contrary to Valspar’s contention, our caselaw does 
not foreclose the possibility that a plaintiff can defeat summary 
judgment with only circumstantial evidence in the Section 1 
oligopoly context. That circumstantial evidence, however, 
must be non-economic evidence of an actual agreement 
between the conspirators, and not just a restatement of the 
interdependent economic conduct that we must accept in an 
oligopolistic marketplace. See Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1242 
(“mere consciously parallel behavior alone is insufficient to 
prove a conspiracy, [but] it is circumstantial evidence from 
which, when supplemented by additional evidence, an illegal 
agreement can be inferred.” (emphasis added)). As explained 
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*  *  * 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
                                              
above, Valspar has not provided circumstantial non-economic 
evidence sufficient to support the inference of a conspiracy. 
1 
 
 
STENGEL, Chief District Judge, dissenting. 
 I respectfully dissent.  
The essential question here is whether thirty-one (31) 
parallel price increase announcements by a small group of 
suppliers over a ten (10) year period were mere coincidence 
(lawful and, in fact, expected in the world of oligopolies) or 
evidence of an agreement to fix prices (unlawful even among 
oligopolists). I think there are enough factual issues in this case 
that the question whether it was a lawful coincidence or an 
unlawful agreement should be decided by a jury. 
The majority’s ruling creates an unworkable burden, not 
supported by our precedent, for plaintiffs seeking to prove a 
Sherman Act price-fixing case with circumstantial evidence. 
Second, it affirms a decision where a district judge weighed 
and compartmentalized evidence, a task better suited for 
juries—not judges.  
An antitrust plaintiff may avoid summary judgment 
based upon circumstantial evidence alone. That concept is 
almost a legal axiom, yet it finds no home in the majority 
opinion. We have long held that a “plaintiff in a section 1 case 
does not have to submit direct evidence, i.e., the so-called 
smoking gun, but can rely solely on circumstantial evidence 
and the reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence.” 
Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 
998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1993); see, e.g., In re Baby Food 
Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 124 (3d Cir. 1999) (“A plaintiff 
in a Section 1 conspiracy can establish a case solely on 
circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom”). In other words, an antitrust plaintiff’s 
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burden at summary judgment “is no different than in any other 
case.” Id.  (quoting Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., 
Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992)); In re Chocolate 
Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 396 (3d Cir. 
2015). Today’s opinion all but explicitly states that, now, “the 
so-called smoking gun,” Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 120, is 
required. 
As a general principle, “antitrust law limits the range of 
permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a § 1 
case,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 588 (1986), and conduct that is “as consistent with 
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy” cannot, on 
its own, support an inference of an antitrust conspiracy, id. 
(citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 
(1984)).  
 This Court favors a sliding scale approach to determine 
the types of inferences allowed to be drawn from 
circumstantial evidence in antitrust cases. According to our 
Circuit’s precedent, and that of the Supreme Court’s, the range 
of inferences that may be drawn from circumstantial evidence 
depends upon “the plausibility of the plaintiffs’ theory and the 
dangers associated with such inferences.” Chocolate, 801 F.3d 
at 396 (quoting In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 
357 (3d Cir. 2004)). In cases where an antitrust plaintiff’s 
economic theory of liability “makes no economic sense,” and 
drawing inferences in the plaintiff’s favor would deter healthy 
competition, the plaintiff must produce “more persuasive 
evidence” to bolster its claim. Id. On the other hand, when a 
plaintiff’s theory makes economic sense, courts draw more 
3 
 
liberal inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. n.8.1 Valspar 
presented an economic theory that makes perfect economic 
sense, yet the District Court and majority did not draw any 
inferences in Valspar’s favor. 
The majority performs a thorough analysis of the 
evidence of parallel conduct and the “plus factors.” Viewing 
all this evidence as a whole, I believe it clear that summary 
judgment was not proper in this case. 
A. Parallel Conduct 
It is true that conscious parallelism alone cannot create 
an inference of conspiracy. The majority has taken this to mean 
that any evidence of conscious parallelism is therefore 
incapable of raising an inference of conspiracy. This is 
incorrect. Parallel pricing is a necessary requirement of any § 
1 price-fixing claim, and simply because parallel pricing alone 
                                              
1 Based on this sliding scale approach—first articulated 
in Matsushita—courts have taken varying approaches to cases 
depending on the strength of the plaintiff’s theory. Compare 
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588–91 (refusing to draw liberal 
inferences from plaintiffs’ “predatory pricing” theory, which 
posited that multiple companies conspired to lower prices, 
because a conspiracy to lower prices makes no economic 
sense), with Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1232 (drawing liberal 
inferences and reversing summary judgment because the 
plaintiff’s theory, that companies conspired not to compete 
with each other, made “perfect economic sense”), and Flat 
Glass, 385 F.3d at 358 (drawing liberal inferences in reversing 
summary judgment given that “an agreement among 
oligopolists to fix prices . . . makes perfect economic sense”). 
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cannot preclude summary judgment does not mean that courts 
ignore evidence of it. Indeed, our precedent has repeatedly 
warned against overlooking this important factor in these types 
of cases, especially where the plaintiff’s economic theory—as 
it does here—makes perfect economic sense.2 
The sheer number of parallel price increase 
announcements in this case—31 to be exact—is 
unprecedented. Cf. Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 369 (reversing 
summary judgment in case involving 7 parallel price increases 
in 5 years); Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 410 (3 parallel price 
increase announcements insufficient to withstand summary 
judgment, in part, because there was no “abrupt” or “radical” 
shift in pre-conspiracy conduct). While this sheer number, in 
itself, cannot carry the day for Valspar, the other evidence 
viewed in conjunction with these parallel price increase 
announcements can.  
This amount of parallel price increase announcements, 
in a relatively short time period, commands attention. In Flat 
Glass, we considered the temporal proximity between the 
companies’ respective price increase announcements as 
evidence of an agreement to conspire. 385 F.3d at 364–67. 
Here, there is evidence that many of the manufacturers’ price 
increase announcements were made within hours, days, or 
                                              
2 We discuss the plausibility of Valspar’s economic 
theory in greater detail infra. For now, it is enough to say we 
have previously held that Valspar’s exact economic theory 
(parallel price fixing among oligopolists) makes perfect 
economic sense: “an agreement among oligopolists to fix 
prices at a supracompetitive level . . . makes perfect economic 
sense.” Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 358.  
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weeks of each other. For example, in one instance, DuPont 
announced a price increase at 11:00 a.m., Tronox matched it 
seven hours later, and Kronos matched it eight hours later. The 
next day, Millennium and Huntsman announced identical price 
increases. In another instance, all five TiO2 manufacturers 
made the same price increase announcement within a four-day 
period. This close timing creates a strong inference of 
conspiracy. 
The unprecedented amount of parallel price increase 
announcements, while not dispositive, would undoubtedly 
raise red flags to any reasonable fact finder. Valspar’s theory 
of liability makes “perfect economic sense.” Chocolate, 801 
F.3d at 396. Accordingly, “more liberal inferences from the 
evidence,” which necessarily includes the 31 parallel price 
increase announcements, should be drawn. Id. The majority’s 
unwillingness to allow more liberal inferences in the plaintiff’s 
favor seems to me to be a mistake. Instead, the majority gave 
little weight to the amount of parallel price increase 
announcements simply because parallel conduct itself is 
insufficient to create an inference of conspiracy. This approach 
sees the trees, not the forest. See Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 357 
(mandating courts analyze the evidence “as a whole” to 
determine whether “it supports an inference of concerted 
action”).  
Of course, “[f]or parallel pricing to go beyond mere 
interdependence, it must be so unusual that in the absence of 
an advance agreement, no reasonable firm would have engaged 
in it.” Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 135. With that said, it is 
undoubtedly a question of fact as to whether the parallel 
pricing in this case was sufficiently “unusual.” Id. No case to 
ever reach us has contained even half the amount of parallel 
price increase announcements present here—not to mention 
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that many of them here were separated by mere days or hours. 
This raises an obvious and serious question after today’s 
decision: What will it now take for a plaintiff relying on 
circumstantial evidence to move the ball across the goal line?  
The sheer amount of parallel conduct in this case, 
coupled with the plausibility of Valspar’s economic theory, 
should inform our analysis of the plus factors. Flat Glass, 385 
F.3d at 358 (“[A]n agreement among oligopolists to fix prices 
at a supracompetitive level . . . makes perfect economic sense” 
and therefore “more liberal inferences from the evidence 
should be permitted than in Matsushita because the attendant 
dangers from drawing inferences recognized in Matsushita are 
not present”); id. at n.8 (“Matsushita itself said little about 
proof requirements in a case where underlying structural 
evidence indicates that the offense is quite plausible” (quoting 
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 917, 925–26 (2003))).3 It did not. The majority 
paid very little mind to these distinctions—especially the 
plausibility of Valspar’s economic theory. 
The majority’s formulation of the summary judgment 
                                              
3 I share the concern of the amicus—namely, that it 
would be an absurd result if, “in situations ‘in which the danger 
of [parallel pricing] is most serious,” liability would actually 
be “less likely.” Amicus Br. at 15 (quoting Louis Kaplow, 
Competition Policy & Price Fixing 126 (2015)). A plain 
reading of our case law reveals this Court never intended to 
ramp up a price-fixing plaintiff’s burden of proof, especially 
when the plaintiff’s economic theory makes perfect economic 
sense. Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 396–97; Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 
358. In fact, courts must do the opposite in such a scenario by 
drawing liberal inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id.  
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standard in this case, coupled with its dismissive treatment of 
unprecedented parallel-conduct evidence, creates too high a 
hurdle for plaintiffs attempting to prove a price-fixing 
conspiracy using circumstantial evidence. The limitations in 
antitrust cases announced in Matsushita, and that we followed 
in Chocolate, were never meant to require something more 
than circumstantial evidence of an agreement to preclude 
summary judgment. Nor did they impose some “special” 
burden. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 
U.S. 451, 467 (1992); see Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 359 n.9 
(“[U]nfortunately, many courts have read Matsushita as 
requiring a certain quantum evidence of verbal agreement 
before summary judgment can be avoided.” (quoting Herbert 
Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 917, 925 (2003))); see also Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1230 
(to create a genuine issue of material fact, the plaintiff “need 
not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by 
the movant, but simply must exceed the ‘scintilla’ standard.”).  
The U.S. Supreme Court has gone so far as to caution 
against this kind of misapplication of Matsushita. In Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., it emphasized: 
The Court’s requirement in Matsushita that the 
plaintiffs’ claims make economic sense did not 
introduce a special burden on plaintiffs facing 
summary judgment in antitrust cases. The Court 
did not hold that if the moving party enunciates 
any economic theory supporting its behavior, 
regardless of its accuracy in reflecting the actual 
market, it is entitled to summary judgment. 
Matsushita demands only that the nonmoving 
party’s inferences be reasonable in order to reach 
the jury, a requirement that was not invented, but 
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merely articulated, in that decision. If the 
plaintiff’s theory is economically senseless, no 
reasonable jury could find in its favor, and 
summary judgment should be granted. 
504 U.S. at 468–69 (footnote omitted). The Court in Eastman 
Kodak also expressed a preference to “resolve antitrust claims 
on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the particular facts 
disclosed by the record.” Id. at 467. This principle is 
particularly poignant here, where the “facts disclosed by the 
record” (i.e., 31 parallel price increase announcements) are 
strongly suggestive of an agreement to fix prices. 
B. The Plus Factors 
Although the majority recognizes there is no exhaustive 
list of plus factors, Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360, it considers 
only a few select plus factors and fails to consider others. There 
is no one plus factor that is “strictly necessary.” Id. at 361 n.12 
(quoting In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 
F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.)). The presence of 
certain plus factors does not automatically preclude summary 
judgment. Id.; see Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1242 (recognizing 
that a “wide range of circumstantial evidence can be used to 
establish needed plus factor”).  
While we often rely on the “big 3” plus factors (motive, 
actions contrary to interest, and traditional conspiracy), the 
plus-factor inquiry is not intended to be rigid or formulaic. Flat 
Glass, 385 F.3d at 361 n.12; Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1242. 
There is a slew of other viable plus factors, including, among 
others: (i) fixed relative market shares; (ii) exchanges of price 
information; and (iii) price, output, and capacity changes at the 
formation of the cartel. See William E. Kovacic et al., Plus 
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Factors and Agreement In Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
393, 415 (2011) (listing Posner’s “fourteen plus factors”); see 
also id. at 423 (recognizing that a company’s redistributions of 
gains and losses—or “true-ups”—are circumstantial evidence 
of a conspiracy); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 87 (2d ed. 
2001) (recognizing “signaling” as a plus factor, especially 
when the announcement occurs before the actual 
implementation of the price increase).  
The majority is correct that evidence of the first two plus 
factors may not always nudge the ball over the goal line for a 
plaintiff at summary judgment because they “often restate 
interdependence.” Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 361. But this is not 
always the case. Because our approach to these cases is fluid, 
and we must not compartmentalize evidence, there are some 
cases where these two factors may not simply restate 
interdependence. Id. n.12. For instance, certain acts against 
self-interest (e.g., non-price acts against self-interest) “cannot 
simply be explained as a result of oligopolistic 
interdependence.” Id. 
1. Motive to Enter Into a Conspiracy 
Motive is “important to a court’s analysis, because [its] 
existence tends to eliminate the possibility of mistaking the 
workings of a competitive market . . . with interdependent, 
supracompetitive pricing.” Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 361. 
The majority mentioned only that evidence of motive 
often restates interdependence and thus does not create an 
inference of concerted action. However, in Chocolate, cited 
often by the majority, we simply recognized that “evidence of 
motive without more does not create a reasonable inference of 
concerted action.” 801 F.3d at 298 (emphasis added). Here, 
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there is much “more.”  
2. Actions Against Self-Interest 
In the District Court, Valspar pointed to substantial 
evidence that DuPont and the other manufacturers acted 
contrary to their self-interest. First, Valspar noted that TiO2 
prices rose despite no change in the TiO2 market. Second, 
Valspar argued that the market shares of the TiO2 
manufacturers remained relatively stable from 2002 to 2013. 
Third, Valspar relied on the fact that DuPont and the other 
manufacturers made intercompany sales to each other at 
below-market value.  
The District Court seemed not to heed Flat Glass’s 
pronouncement that “certain types of ‘actions against self 
interest’ may do more than restate economic interdependence.” 
385 F.3d at 361 n.12.4 The explicit examples cited in Flat Glass 
were “unilateral exchanges of confidential price information.” 
Id. Unilateral exchanges of confidential price information, like 
other non-price actions against self-interest, “cannot simply be 
explained as a result of oligopolistic interdependence.” Id. 
Valspar presented a triable issue of fact on this point below. 
There is evidence that the GSP allowed DuPont and the other 
manufacturers to gain confidential information about each 
other regarding supply, demand, inventory, and market share.  
In a 2002 email, Paul Bradley at Huntsman noted that it 
                                              
4 The majority simply states, without consideration of 
the actual evidence, that “Valspar has not shown” that the first 
two plus factors “do more than restate the theory of 
interdependence.” Majority at 20 n.9. The actual evidence, 
discussed supra and infra, shows otherwise. 
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would be possible to “derive” each individual manufacturer’s 
production of TiO2 from the GSP data. Valspar also produced 
evidence suggesting that the manufacturers collectively used 
industry consultant Jim Fisher as a conduit to share 
confidential information. Fisher attended an industry 
conference which the manufacturers—including DuPont—
attended. According to Fisher, at this conference the TiO2 
manufacturers “discussed the need to take advantage of tight 
market conditions to improve pricing.”5  
The same actions contrary to self-interest that led the 
Seventh Circuit to reverse summary judgment in High 
Fructose are also present here. Areeda’s treatise recognizes 
this in identifying the type of oligopoly that may nonetheless 
be collusive: “there were numerous oral and some written 
statements by employees of the defendant to the effect that they 
had an understanding that they would not undercut one 
another’s prices and that they were involved in an organization 
(i.e. cartel) controlling prices.” Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1431b, at 232 (3d ed. 2010) 
(citing High Fructose, 295 F.3d at 662). As in High Fructose, 
here there are numerous statements from the manufacturers’ 
employees (including DuPont) expressing an understanding 
that they “would not undercut one another’s prices” and that 
they were involved in an organization to control prices. Id. In 
one email, ironically, the DuPont author parrots Areeda’s 
above “undercut[ting]” language verbatim in advising others to 
modify pricing “[o]nly if you are not undercutting a Kronos 
price increase!!!!!” Cf. High Fructose, 295 F.3d at 662 
(statement from defendant that “[w]e have an understanding 
                                              
5 In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 959 F. Supp. 
2d 799, 812–13 (D. Md. 2013). 
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within the industry not to undercut each other’s prices” served 
as evidence of “an explicit agreement to fix prices” (Posner, 
J.)). Another email from a different competitor recognized that 
“all are still acting in a disciplined manner, respecting each 
other’s market positions and share and holding price.”  
There is no shortage of these emails, all of which 
support an inference that the TiO2 manufacturers were 
working together pursuant to an agreement to maintain price. 
There are further emails indicating that all the TiO2 suppliers 
were “on the bus,” that DuPont was “training” others on price, 
and that some of the suppliers were planning price increase 
announcements in order to allow other suppliers to “get on 
their horses.” In 2006, a DuPont executive went so far as to 
comment about another’s price increase: “the timing may be 
no coincidence – their reading of the CEFIC info like ours 
should give them confidence that NA [North American] price 
increases can be prosecuted despite the flat market.” This email 
is particularly probative of an agreement, given the DuPont 
executive’s recognition that they could continue to hike up 
prices even though demand was decreasing. See Flat Glass, 
385 F.3d at 358 (finding oligopolists “raising prices” indicative 
of a conspiracy when the price increases were made “absent 
increases in marginal cost or demand”). 
The repetitive pattern of public price increase 
announcements is also a garden variety example of action 
against self-interest. When there is evidence that “the 
publication of wholesale price increases was intended to make, 
and has the effect of . . . ensuring competitors could quickly 
learn of, and respond to” these price increases, an inference of 
an agreement to fix prices arises. See Petroleum Prods. 
Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 446–47 (9th Cir. 1990). A “price 
announcement given in the hope that rivals will follow” 
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evinces an agreement if “repetition creates an expectation of 
such behavior.” Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1422b, 
at 171 (3d ed. 2010); see id. (“Although . . . mere proof of 
interdependent pricing, standing alone, may not serve as proof 
of an antitrust violation, we believe that the evidence 
concerning the purpose and effect of price announcements, 
when considered together with the evidence concerning the 
parallel pattern of price restorations, is sufficient to support a 
reasonable and permissible inference of an agreement, whether 
express or tacit, to raise or stabilize prices.” (quoting 
Petroleum Prods., 906 F.2d at 446–47)).6  
The majority relies heavily on the fact that not all of the 
co-conspirators’ parallel price increase announcements 
resulted in a sale at the actual announced price. Drawing a 
distinction between price increase announcements and actual 
                                              
6 Citing to one single DuPont email, the majority 
reasons that “[h]ad the competitors got[ten] together and 
exchanged assurances of common action or otherwise adopted 
a common plan, . . . there would have been no need for DuPont 
to resort to public announcements to ‘test’ whether its 
competitors were ‘receiving/understanding [its] price increase 
messages.” Majority at 29 n.14. While it may be possible to 
reach this conclusion by reading one email in isolation, the 
evidence as a whole creates a reasonable inference that there 
was more likely than not an agreement to fix prices. For 
example, evidence of the meetings between Fisher and all the 
alleged conspirators, as well as the actual meetings of top 
executives from Kronos and Huntsman (followed almost 
immediately by a parallel price increase announcement), as 
well as the conspirators all discussing “improving pricing” 
does create an inference of “a common plan.” 
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increases has been criticized by judges and scholars alike. 
Judge Posner has emphasized that “[i]n deciding whether there 
is enough evidence of price fixing to create a jury issue, a court 
asked to dismiss a price-fixing suit on summary judgment must 
be careful to avoid three traps.” High Fructose, 295 F.3d at 
661. 
One of Judge Posner’s traps is “to distinguish between 
the existence of a conspiracy and its efficacy.” Id. at 656. In 
other words, arguing that although there was an agreement to 
fix prices, the goods were not actually sold at that price. Id. The 
majority does just that by relying on the fact that, often times, 
DuPont and the manufacturers sold TiO2 at a lower price than 
reflected in their initial parallel price increase announcements. 
As explained by Areeda (who the majority cites frequently and 
whose opinions permeate Third Circuit antitrust 
jurisprudence), a “price announcement given in the hope that 
rivals will follow” evinces an agreement if “repetition creates 
an expectation of such behavior.” Areeda & Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Law ¶ 1422b, at 171 (3d ed. 2010) (emphasis added).  
Our own precedent is at odds with such an analysis. See 
Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 362 (rejecting the argument that 
“regardless of the . . . list prices, . . . the prices at which flat 
glass producers actually sold their product to customers [] 
declined during the period of the alleged conspiracy” because 
“[a]n agreement to fix prices is . . . a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act even if most or for that matter all transactions 
occurred at lower prices” (citing High Fructose, 295 F.3d at 
656) (emphasis added)). 
The majority fell into this trap. There is plenty of 
evidence, in the form of emails, that DuPont and the other TiO2 
manufacturers made price increase announcements “in the 
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hope that rivals will follow.” Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust 
Law ¶ 1422b, at 171. While this is not conclusive evidence of 
an agreement, the scale tips in favor of finding an agreement 
when there is “repetition” of such price increase 
announcements. Id. If nothing else, this case involves repetitive 
price announcements. This repetition clearly gave the suppliers 
“an expectation,” id., which is further illuminated by the 
drastic increase in parallel price increase announcements from 
2002 to 2013. These emails, in conjunction with the pattern, 
frequency, and effect of the price announcements, tend to 
exclude the possibility that the TiO2 manufacturers were 
acting independently.  
Valspar also presented evidence that DuPont and the 
other suppliers consciously maintained static market shares. 
Market share stability is a well-recognized symptom of 
collusive and concerted action in antitrust cases. See William 
E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust 
Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 415, 422 (2011).7 The logic is not 
difficult to understand: a company acting in a healthy, 
competitive, and self-interested manner would seek to 
expand—not maintain or decrease—its own market share.8 
                                              
7 The majority criticizes Valspar’s reliance on legal 
scholarship as opposed to case law. This is interesting given 
that (1) this Court has long turned to legal scholarship to inform 
their decisions in antitrust cases involving oligopolists, and (2) 
the majority itself cites to legal scholarship—including 
multiple law review articles—seven times.  
 
8 For example, say Company A has a 30% market share 
in a particular industry and Company B has a 40% market share 
in that industry. Obviously, Company A and B, assuming they 
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The District Court acknowledged this evidence. Instead of 
submitting it to the jury as a disputed question of fact, however, 
the District Court summarily concluded that this evidence did 
not show collusion because the TiO2 market is an oligopoly. 
Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours, 152 F. Supp. 3d 
234, 242–43 (D. Del. 2016). The majority took the same 
approach. Just like the District Court, the majority weighed the 
expert evidence on this issue and made a finding: that the 
evidence of (likely unilateral) market share stability was 
insufficient in this case to show concerted action or agreement. 
It seems to me that if the court is “weighing evidence” or 
“making findings” it should be at trial, on a full record and 
done by a fact finder, i.e., a jury or judge sitting without a jury. 
Dovetailing with this evidence of static market shares is 
evidence that the TiO2 manufacturers made intercompany 
sales of TiO2, meaning they sold TiO2 to one another. This 
evidence might indicate pure competition but for the fact that 
the manufacturers frequently sold the TiO2 to their 
competitors, at below-market prices. For example, when 
DuPont would sell Kronos TiO2, Kronos paid an average of 
16% less for the TiO2 than DuPont’s own customers did. 
DuPont also sold TiO2 to Millennium at below-market prices.9 
One of Valspar’s experts, Dr. Williams, was able to identify 
                                              
are competitive, would want to acquire as much market share 
for themselves as possible. Therefore, it would defy all logic 
and notions of procompetitive behavior for Company A (who 
has a lower market share) to take affirmative actions to stay at 
30% rather than grow beyond a 30% market share. 
  
9 Titanium Dioxide, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 814. 
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years of below-market sales between the TiO2 manufacturers.  
The majority downplays this evidence of below-market 
intercompany sales. It apparently considered these sales just as 
consistent with non-collusive activity as with conspiracy 
because: (1) DuPont used some TiO2 in its own production in 
2005 and 2006; (2) a DuPont plant in Mississippi shut down 
for five months; and (3) DuPont’s sales to Kronos were 
governed by a patent settlement agreement from 2006 to 2008. 
The District Court, and the majority, found the volume of 
intercompany sales insufficient to constitute a “true-up.”10 
The majority notes that the intercompany sales were 
low in number and unlikely to show an agreement. According 
to this logic, there is no evidence of a “true-up” because the 
intercompany sales were fairly low in quantity. Yet the very 
purpose of a “true-up” is for the companies within a cartel to 
maintain their market share. Therefore, it might not necessarily 
make sense for a company to make a large cross-sale, or a large 
number of cross-sales, in order to maintain its relative market 
share.11 
                                              
10 A “true-up” occurs when companies in a conspiracy 
redistribute their individual gains and losses in order to comply 
with their conspiratorial agreement. Kovacic et al., Plus 
Factors, at 423. Such a transaction “leads to a strong inference 
of collusion” since there is “no reasonable noncollusive 
explanation” for intercompany sales at “nonmarket prices” 
between companies that are supposed to be competing with one 
another. Id. 
 
11 To use another example, say Company A enjoys 35% 
of the market share, while Company B has 50% of the market 
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Obviously, intercompany sales “could” be 
redistributions of gains or losses, Valspar, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 
244, and “might” be explained by the closed DuPont plant, id. 
However, these “coulds” and “mights” cast doubt on—not 
support—DuPont’s argument for summary judgment. Where 
there are reasonable inferences that there was more likely than 
not a conspiracy to fix prices, summary judgment is not 
proper.12 The majority, like the District Court, accepted each 
                                              
share. Assume A and B are colluding and, thus, they want to 
raise prices and maintain market shares per their agreement. 
Then assume that Company A’s share drops to 33%. Company 
B may sell a very small amount of product to Company A 
simply to allow Company A to maintain its market share. 
Mistaking this as an insignificant sale, merely because of its 
size or lack of frequency, would be an oversight. 
 
12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states: “The court 
shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
Simply because courts must exercise caution in these types of 
cases does not do away with Rule 56’s proposition that genuine 
disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment: 
“Generally, the movant’s burden on a summary judgment 
motion in an antitrust case 
‘is no different than in any other case.’” Intervest, 340 F.3d at 
159. In these cases, courts still must deny summary judgment 
if there is a genuine dispute of material fact and “view the facts 
and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” Id. 
(emphasis added) (citing Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 456). 
The majority did not do this. Also contrary to the majority’s 
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of DuPont’s explanations of possibly conspiratorial conduct 
and adopted each without much explanation. This approach 
should be unacceptable at the summary judgment stage. See 
Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 368 (explaining we should not 
“consider each individual piece of evidence and disregard it if 
we could feasibly interpret it as consistent with the absence of 
an agreement to raise prices”); Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1230 (to 
create a genuine issue of material fact, the plaintiff “need not 
match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the 
movant, but simply must exceed the ‘scintilla’ standard.”); 
Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law § 14.03b, at 14–25 (4th 
ed. 2011) (plaintiffs need not “disprove all nonconspiratorial 
explanations for the defendants’ conduct” to prevail at 
summary judgment). 
3. Traditional Conspiracy Evidence 
Traditional conspiracy evidence is often the most 
important “plus factor” in a case like this one. Chocolate, 801 
F.3d at 401. Traditional conspiracy evidence is evidence that 
“the defendants got together and exchanged assurances of 
common action or otherwise adopted a common plan even 
though no meetings, conversations, or exchanged documents 
are shown.” E.g., id. at 398. Even though “no meetings, 
conversations, or exchanged documents” are required as direct 
evidence of a conspiracy, DuPont urged us to require, in 
essence, exactly that.  
This Court has explicitly and repeatedly held that 
“traditional conspiracy” evidence may exist “even though no 
                                              
entire analysis, the “special consideration” and “caution” we 
apply in these types of cases informs—not supplants—the 
general guidelines found in Rule 56. 
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meetings, conversations, or exchanged documents are shown.” 
Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 398 (emphasis added); Superior 
Offshore Internat’l, Inc. v. Bristow Grp., 490 F. App’x 492, 
499 (3d Cir. 2012); Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 
212, 227 (3d Cir. 2011); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 
618 F.3d 300, 322 (3d Cir. 2010); Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 361. 
Yet the majority seems to require Valspar to present evidence 
of direct meetings and conversations. The majority reasoned 
that since “there is no evidence that there was any discussion 
of prices during these meetings and certainly no evidence of an 
agreement,” Valspar’s argument “falls short.” Maj. Op. at 21.  
In reality, Valspar presented various forms of traditional 
conspiracy evidence. For example, Valspar presented a 
Millennium email stating “we have competition on board for 
the Oct 1 price increase announcement.”13 Having 
“competition on board” for a price increase announcement 
certainly conveys that the suppliers somehow got together and 
exchanged assurances of “common action,” i.e., to announce 
the same prices. Id. The same goes for the suppliers’ emails 
about the “collective needs” of the industry14  and getting 
everyone “on the bus” or, put another way, “on their horses.” 
Today’s decision could easily be read to require direct 
evidence of an agreement in an oligopoly/antitrust case despite 
                                              
13 Titanium Dioxide, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 829. 
 
14 The District Court read this to mean the “collective 
needs” of Millennium alone. However, read in the context of 
the entire email, a reasonable jury could certainly conclude the 
opposite: that the author was referring to the collective needs 
of the TiO2 industry members.  
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the fact that neither our prior jurisprudence (nor the Supreme 
Court’s) has ever required such evidence. What’s more, it is 
not even correct to state that no meetings or conversations 
between competitors took place. In 2004, the CEO of 
Millennium met with the President of Huntsman. The very next 
day, an internal Millennium email stated that they had 
“competition on board for the Oct 1 price increase 
announcement.” A few years earlier in 2002, DuPont 
announced a price increase a few days after Jim Fisher met 
with Kronos and then with DuPont. And if that wasn’t enough, 
according to Jim Fisher, the suppliers, at a meeting together, 
“discussed the need to take advantage of tight market 
conditions to improve pricing.”15  
I am not sure how this circumstantial evidence could be 
stronger. It unequivocally shows that one alleged conspirator’s 
(Millenium’s) CEO met with another alleged conspirator’s 
(Huntsman’s) President days before a parallel price increase 
announcement. This meeting occurred at the same time an 
email was written stating that TiO2 “competition” was “on 
board” with a particular price increase announcement. Even 
more persuasive, there is evidence that all the TiO2 suppliers 
discussed “improv[ing] pricing” at an industry conference in 
2005 and that in 2002 DuPont and Kronos announced an 
identical price increase just days after Jim Fisher met with 
these two “competitors.”  
A jury should be allowed to determine whether Fisher’s 
meetings with both Kronos and DuPont—days before a 
parallel price increase announcement—were suspect. A jury 
                                              
15 In re Titanium Dioxide, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 812–13 
(quoting Fisher) (emphasis added). 
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should be allowed to determine whether an email that 
“competition” is “on board” for a price increase announcement 
was concerted action, particularly when this email was written 
one day after Huntsman’s President personally met with 
Millennium’s CEO. A jury should be been permitted to decide 
whether a meeting with the TiO2 manufacturers, in which they 
explicitly discussed “improv[ing] pricing,” supports an 
inference of concerted action. This is the exact sort of powerful 
evidentiary synergy the majority implies is absent from 
Valspar’s case.16 This approach misses by a mile an essential 
truth of actual courtroom litigation: that circumstantial 
evidence is competent, valid, and vital evidence in almost 
every conspiracy trial, civil or criminal. The courtroom 
litigation process, though sometimes messy and unpredictable, 
is the preferred method for the resolution of factual questions 
under our Seventh Amendment. And, with all its quirks, the 
                                              
16 The majority does not discuss this particularly 
damning evidence, but states generally that “the record does 
not show the existence of an actual agreement.” Majority at 23 
n.11. Contrary to the majority’s insistence, an actual agreement 
can be shown in the exact way that Valspar has set out to do so 
in this case. See Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1422b, 
at 171 (3d ed. 2010) (“Although . . . mere proof of 
interdependent pricing, standing alone, may not serve as proof 
of an antitrust violation, we believe that the evidence 
concerning the purpose and effect of price announcements, 
when considered together with the evidence concerning the 
parallel pattern of price restorations, is sufficient to support a 
reasonable and permissible inference of an agreement, 
whether express or tacit, to raise or stabilize prices.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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civil trial is a far better method of evaluating evidence, direct 
or circumstantial, than an academic parsing of a printed record 
developed in discovery. 
The inculpatory flavor of these emails is enhanced by 
the fact that the suppliers were all a part of the TDMA, which 
gave them access to highly confidential information via the 
GSP. The majority attempts to analogize the GSP to In re Citric 
Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1990). In Citric Acid, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected a 
theory that the alleged conspirators used their membership in a 
trade association as a front for conducting conspiratorial 
activities.  191 F.3d at 1097–98. It aptly pointed out that if 
courts “allowed conspiracy to be inferred from such activities 
alone, we would have to allow an inference of conspiracy 
whenever a trade association took almost any action.” Citric 
Acid, 191 F.3d at 1098 (emphasis added). 
I agree with the majority that membership in a trade 
association, in itself, cannot serve as traditional evidence of a 
conspiracy. Nonetheless, our task is not to view the TiO2 
suppliers’ membership in the TDMA in a vacuum. When 
viewed in conjunction with the other evidence, the membership 
can be seen in a much different light than Citric Acid. For 
starters, there is evidence here (absent in Citric Acid, 
Chocolate, or any other case) of 31 parallel price increase 
announcements. Nearly all of these announcements came 
within thirty days of a TDMA meeting.17 Also absent from 
                                              
17 DuPont’s insistence that it did not begin attending 
TDMA meetings until 2010 is moot given that it attended 
CEFIC meetings—long before 2010—that were concurrent 
with the TDMA meetings. Valspar, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 246 n.5. 
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Chocolate or Citric Acid is the presence of an industry 
consultant (Jim Fisher) who was simultaneously retained by 
multiple “competitors” to gather pricing information. 
Obviously, no court could say with certainty that DuPont 
agreed to fix prices with the other suppliers at the TDMA 
meetings. But making a judicial determination with certainty is 
not our job at summary judgment. The point is that, the above 
evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to Valspar—whose 
theory makes perfect economic sense—creates an inference of 
concerted action sufficient to reach a jury. 
The majority downplays the role of this key “industry 
consultant” Jim Fisher. There is evidence suggesting Fisher 
was used as a vehicle to carry out the suppliers’ collusive 
agreement. On June 11, 2002, DuPont publicly announced a 
price increase.18 Four days prior, Jim Fisher had called 
DuPont’s Competitive Intelligence Manager, Connie Hubbard. 
In that conversation, Fisher conveyed confidential pricing 
information about one of DuPont’s competitors: Huntsman. 
This was the first Hubbard had heard of this Huntsman increase 
because it had not been announced publicly. This interaction, 
in itself, provides traditional conspiracy evidence in that it 
suggests Huntsman and DuPont may have used Fisher to 
implement a “common plan” to fix prices “even though no 
meetings, conversations, or exchanged documents are shown” 
between Huntsman and DuPont. Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 398.19 
                                              
18 Titanium Dioxide, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 811. 
 
19 Obviously, based on this evidence, and other evidence 
of Fisher’s cross-company communications, a reasonable jury 
could infer that no direct conversations between the TiO2 
manufacturers were needed if Fisher acted as their mouthpiece. 
25 
 
There is plentiful evidence of price signaling (another 
plus factor) in this case. In Petroleum Products Antitrust 
Litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
confronted nearly identical circumstantial evidence of price 
signaling. 906 F.2d 432, 446 (9th Cir. 1990). Like here, in 
Petroleum Products, there was evidence that the competitors’ 
“price increases were occasionally announced in advance of 
their effective date.” 906 F.2d at 446 n.11. This type of 
preemptive announcement, the Ninth Circuit recognized, is 
“effective in allowing the price leader to communicate its 
intention and to receive reactions without having to incur 
substantial risk.” Petroleum Prods., 906 F.2d at 446 n.11. 
 DuPont maintains that it made price announcements 
publicly because it was required to do so per its contracts with 
customers. While it is true that DuPont was required to notify 
its customers when it changed its price, there is no evidence 
that DuPont was required to do so publicly. In fact, the record 
evidence suggests the opposite. Notably, DuPont never 
publicly announced price decreases. This supports an inference 
that DuPont’s public price increase announcements were for 
the purpose of collusion rather than customer notification.  
The TiO2 manufacturers even admitted they did not use 
public price increase announcements to notify customers. 
When asked about the purpose of public announcements, 
Kronos’s Jay Becker agreed he would “never” rely on a public 
price increase to provide Kronos customers with notice of a 
price increase. Gary Cianfichi, from Millennium, similarly 
stated that he did not believe any customer contract required 
public notice. Larry Rogers, from Kronos, testified he “really 
couldn’t say why” price increases were announced publicly 
given that the customers were notified privately in writing. 
This evidence also supports an inference that the 
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manufacturers used public price increase announcements as a 
concerted method of fixing prices market-wide. 
 The traditional conspiracy evidence in this case is much 
different than it was in Chocolate. We recognized in Chocolate 
that a company’s departure from pre-conspiracy conduct can 
serve as traditional conspiracy evidence, which is the “most 
important plus factor.” Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 401, 410. The 
caveat is that the change from pre- to post-conspiracy conduct 
must be “radical” or “abrupt.” Id. at 410. In Chocolate, there 
was no radical or abrupt change. This case differs from the 
departure of pre-conspiracy conduct in Chocolate in three 
significant respects.  
First, and most basic, Chocolate involved comparing 2 
pre-conspiracy price increases with 3 post-conspiracy price 
increases. Id. Here, by stark contrast, we must compare 3 pre-
conspiracy increases with 31 post-conspiracy increases. In 
other words, in Chocolate, the pre-post ratio was just above 1:1 
whereas here the ratio is 10:1. It would be difficult to claim that 
such a change in conduct is not “abrupt” or “radical.” In a case 
with unprecedented (31) parallel price increase 
announcements, such a finding creates an unwarranted burden 
for plaintiffs relying on circumstantial evidence to prove a 
price-fixing conspiracy. The majority attempts to explain this 
radical and abrupt shift, implying it was “just an uptick in 
frequency.”  
 Second, the nature of the communications between 
competitors in Chocolate is different from the communications 
here. In Chocolate, we found the communications 
unpersuasive in part because “unlike in Flat Glass,” the 
communications did “not reveal pricing plans dependent on 
others following.” Id. at 408. Here there is evidence, as in Flat 
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Glass, that could give rise to an inference that the TiO2 
manufacturers’ pricing decisions were dependent upon the 
decisions of others. Like Flat Glass and unlike Chocolate, the 
communications here were made between high-level rather 
than low-level employees. The evidence that Fisher 
communicated contemporaneously with people from Kronos, 
Millennium, Huntsman, and DuPont suggests the individual 
suppliers’ pricing plans were “dependent on others following.” 
Id. The DuPont email advising to modify pricing “[o]nly if” it 
meant a Kronos price increase would not be “undercut” 
similarly suggests pricing plans “dependent on others 
following.” Id. (emphasis added). As does Fisher’s direct 
testimony that, at an industry meeting, the TiO2 suppliers 
“discussed the need to take advantage of tight market 
conditions to improve pricing.”20  Finally, evidence that certain 
executives asked Jim Fisher to confirm others’ planned price 
increase announcements further indicates the suppliers were 
making decisions not on their own—as the evidence showed in 
Chocolate—but rather, as in Flat Glass, based on other 
suppliers’ price decisions. 
 Third, the pre-conspiracy prices in Chocolate related to 
“different products” than the post-conspiracy price increases. 
801 F.3d at 410. Here, the pre-conspiracy and post-conspiracy 
price increase announcements related to the same fungible 
product: TiO2. This argument, unlike the argument of the 
appellants in Chocolate, is an exact “apples-to-apples” 
comparison. Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 410. 
 One final point has been overlooked in comparing this 
case to Flat Glass and Chocolate: neither Flat Glass nor 
Chocolate involved nearly as many parallel price increase 
                                              
20 In re Titanium Dioxide, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 812–13. 
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announcements as we have here. To be clear, again, these 
parallel price increase announcements, viewed alone, are not 
enough to defeat summary judgment. However, we are not to 
“consider each individual piece of evidence and disregard it if 
we could feasibly interpret it as consistent with the absence of 
an agreement to raise prices.” Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 368. 
When viewed alongside all the other evidence in this case, the 
unprecedented parallel price increase announcements—many 
of which were made hours or days within each other—create 
an inference that the suppliers’ conduct was collusive. 
These principles are especially important given that the 
majority continually relies on the proposition that “[c]onduct 
as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal 
conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of 
conspiracy sufficient to survive summary judgment.” 
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588; see Valspar, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 
240, 244, 246, 249, 252–53 (relying on this principle with 
respect to individual pieces of evidence). But see Flat Glass, 
385 F.3d at 368 (courts shall not “consider each individual 
piece of evidence and disregard it if we could feasibly interpret 
it as consistent with the absence of an agreement to raise 
prices”). Matsushita seems wrongly applied when used to 
discredit each separate piece of proffered evidence an antitrust 
plaintiff brings forth. Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 358 n.8, 359 n.9. 
It is also wrongly applied in a case like this, where the 
plaintiffs’ theory—oligopolists conspired to fix prices—makes 
perfect economic sense. Id. at 358; Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 
1231–33 (rendering the Matsushita presumption against liberal 
inferences “unnecessary” because the plaintiffs’ “theory is not 
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implausible”).21 
It would not be too difficult to view the 31 parallel price 
increase announcements, standing alone, as consistent with 
interdependence. This, of course, would ignore the 
comparatively miniscule amount of pre-conspiracy price 
increase announcements: 3. It would also not be too difficult to 
view the relative market share stability of the TiO2 suppliers, 
standing alone, as consistent with interdependence. This, of 
course, would ignore the simultaneous intercompany sales at 
below-market value. The same goes for the manufacturers’ 
TDMA and CEFIC membership, meetings, and the GSP. There 
is nothing inherently collusive about trade associations, 
industry meetings, or aggregated statistics. This too, of course, 
would ignore the role Jim Fisher played as a communicator of 
confidential information between the TiO2 suppliers and that 
the co-conspirators’ executives had meetings together days and 
hours before they announced parallel price increases. 
The majority seems to discount the plausibility of 
Valspar’s economic theory. This factor has been a focal point 
in our antitrust jurisprudence for decades. Matsushita, 475 U.S. 
                                              
21 DuPont relied on the requirement that, to survive 
summary judgment, Valspar must present evidence that “tends 
to exclude the possibility” that the alleged conspirators acted 
independently. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588. All of the 
evidence in this case, viewed in its totality, tends to exclude 
that the TiO2 manufacturers acted independently.  Contrary to 
DuPont’s interpretation, “tends to exclude the possibility” does 
not mean “unequivocally excludes the possibility.” Such a 
standard would defy our basic summary judgment 
jurisprudence, which views the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. 
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at 588–91; Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 396; Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 
358; Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1232. The majority substitutes this 
distinct factor with the more general theory of 
interdependence. See Maj. Op. at 8 n.1. According to the 
majority, in Flat Glass, this Court refused to draw liberal 
inferences in favor of the plaintiff because of the theory of 
interdependence. In fact, this Court did draw liberal inferences 
in Flat Glass, and reversed summary judgment, partly because 
the plaintiff’s economic theory made perfect sense. It simply 
stated, in passing, that courts must be “cautious in accepting 
inferences from circumstantial evidence” in these types of 
cases—not that they do not do so. Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 358. 
 There is no disagreement here that courts should take a 
“cautious” approach to accepting inferences from 
circumstantial evidence in price-fixing cases involving 
oligopolies. See Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 412 (explaining this 
approach); Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 358–59 (same). I agree that 
this cautious approach is consistent with our Circuit’s law. I 
disagree with the majority’s transformation of this general 
“cautious” approach into a new approach that appears to shut 
the door on a district court’s ability to accept reasonable 
inferences in any case involving oligopolists. Such a black-
and-white approach is not resonant of the type of “caution” 
discussed in Flat Glass and Chocolate, but rather acts to usurp 
the jury’s role in deciding cases loaded with circumstantial 
evidence of an actual agreement to fix prices.  
In Chocolate, this Court confirmed that “[u]nder 
Matsushita, the range of acceptable inferences that may be 
drawn from ambiguous or circumstantial evidence varies with 
the plausibility of the plaintiffs’ theory.” 801 F.3d at 396; see 
also id. at n.8 (comparing cases where this Court has drawn 
liberal inferences when the plaintiff’s theory made sense with 
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cases where this Court refused to do so because the theory did 
not make sense). In Chocolate, this Court did not view the 
theory of interdependence as a complete roadblock to drawing 
liberal inferences. Id. at 396–97. The only time this should 
happen is if the plaintiff is relying on “ambiguous evidence 
alone.” Id. at 396. Up until today, the general theory of 
interdependence never supplanted a court’s consideration of 
the plaintiff’s economic theory.22 
                                              
22 In an attempt to assuage concerns about its analysis, 
the majority tries to justify its heightened standard through 
Chocolate. According to the majority, this Circuit’s precedent 
has long required a plaintiff in this type of case to prove that it 
is “more likely than not” true that there was a price-fixing 
conspiracy in order to survive summary judgment. Majority at 
9 n.1, 13, 13 n.4, 29–30, 29 n.14. The majority makes too much 
of this dicta. This was not, as the majority claims, some 
profound announcement of a new legal standard or rule. 
Indeed, this purportedly axiomatic language has never once 
been used in any other price-fixing case involving oligopolies. 
See generally Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574 (not using this 
language anywhere); Monsanto, 465 U.S. 752 (same); Flat 
Glass, 385 F.3d 350 (same); Baby Food, 166 F.3d 112 (same). 
The use of that phrase in Chocolate simply reflected the 
Court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs, in that particular case, 
had not been able to point to any reasonable inferences of a 
conspiracy. Even assuming arguendo this alleged “standard” 
were actually the measuring stick, the plaintiffs in this case 
have certainly met it. 
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 C. Conclusion 
 I am certainly mindful of the theory of interdependence 
and the presence of an oligopoly. With that said, from the very 
start, Valspar presented a theory that makes perfect economic 
sense. It supported this theory with strong evidence of parallel 
conduct in the form of 31 (an unprecedented amount) of 
parallel price increase announcements. Recognizing conscious 
parallelism to be insufficient on its own to survive summary 
judgment, Valspar also presented viable evidence in support of 
the plus factors: (i) price signaling, (ii) exchanges of 
confidential information, (iii) relatively static market shares, 
(iv) intercompany sales of TiO2 at below market price, (v) 
abrupt departure from pre-conspiracy conduct, and (vi) a 
market susceptible to conspiracy. Although the TiO2 market is 
an oligopoly, Valspar also presented evidence that did not 
simply restate interdependence: non-price acts against self-
interest. Finally, it presented traditional conspiracy evidence. 
Viewed together, and not compartmentalized, all this evidence 
was more than sufficient to preclude summary judgment. 
 
 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
